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California has been a pretty friendly state if you're a worker
looking to cheat the system. I
This statement is widely perceived to be an accurate description of
workers' compensation law in California. Legislators, the public, and in-
volved parties decry rampant abuses in the system.2 An area of particu-
lar disdain involves the "mental stress" claim, whereby a worker receives
compensation after suffering disabling mental or emotional3 job stress.4
1. Mark Lacter, Work Comp Half-Step, L.A. DAILY J., July 27, 1993, at 6.
2. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 note (West Supp. 1994) (Historical and Statutory
Notes) (letter from Gov. Pete Wilson to California Assembly (July 16, 1993)); Lacter, supra
note 1, at 6 (stating that "[w]orkers' compensation remains a scandal of immense proportions"
and fraud causes "cynicism" towards all claims and overall system); Dan Walters, Work Comp
Overhaul, L.A. DAILY J., July 21, 1993, at 6 (discussing reforms to "scandalously inefficient
and expensive workers' compensation system").
3. In actuality, stress itself is not a mental disorder within the meaning of the California
Workers' Compensation statute. See HERBERT LASKY, GUIDELINES FOR HANDLING PSY-
CHIATRIC ISSUES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES 56 (1988). Thus, if an employee seeks
workers' compensation claiming stress, the employee must show that the stress caused a disa-
bling mental injury, as defined by relevant statutory provisions, and that the disabling mental
injury is attributable to employment rather than "non-industrial factors." Id.
Mental injuries in stress claims bear numerous labels. For example, stress claim injuries
are often termed a neurosis or a mental, emotional, psychic, psychiatric, psychological, or
psychoneurotic injury. See I WARREN L. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJU-
RIES AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 4.69 (2d ed. rev. 1993); 1 STANFORD D. HERLICK,
CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW PRACTICE § 10.24 (4th ed. 1991); lB ARTHUR
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.20 (1993). This Comment uses the
term "mental stress" for consistency.
4. See Paul Lees-Haley, Unintentionally Fraudulent Claims for Stress Disorders, 55 DEF.
COUNS. J. 194, 194 (1988) ("Numerous individuals unintentionally are behaving in a fashion
calculated to increase erroneous diagnoses of stress disorders."); Rebecca Kuzins, Ex-Judge
Requests Compensation for Job-Related Stress, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 5, 1985, at 1 (detailing
stress claim filed by former judge claiming aggravation of heart problems due to "acrimonious
relationship with another judge" about which claimant's physician stated that, after one par-
ticularly upsetting incident, claimant "decided to play golf that afternoon to help him un-
wind"); Lawrence P. Postol & Mary W. Adelman, Stress Claims in the Workplace, FOR DEF.,
Aug. 1990, at 5, 6 (discussing category of stress claims that are "easily and frequently feigned
or are caused by factors other than the work injury").
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Differences exist among the states' workers' compensation statutes
for compensating various types of mental stress injuries.' A number of
states limit compensation for mental injury claims by requiring an "unu-
sual" level of stress-greater than everyday, ordinary workplace stress.'
5. The three mental injury categories generally recognized are (1) "physical-mental"
claims in which a compensable physical injury leads to a mental disorder, (2) "mental-physi-
cal" claims in which an initial mental stress produces a physical injury, and (3) "mental-
mental" claims in which mental stress leads to mental injury. Peter S. Barth, Workers' Com-
pensation for Mental Stress Cases, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 349, 351-56 (1990); see I HANNA,
supra note 3, § 4.69[l], at 4-96; George D. Bussey, Mental "Stress" Claims and Workers' Com-
pensation: The Problems and Suggestions for Change, 43 FED'N INS. CORP. COUNS. Q. 99,
103-04 (1990).
An example of a physical-mental injury is a claim filed for a mental injury resulting from
a physical event, such as a worker who fell from a ladder and now suffers from fear of climb-
ing. Donald C. Dilworth, Stress Problems Increase as Workplace Changes, TRIAL, Feb. 1991,
at 11, 11. The mental-physical category includes claims that attribute physical disorders, such
as heart attacks or ulcers, to mental stress. Id. at 11-12. The mental-mental claim, which is
the focus of this Comment, does not assert that a physical injury either caused or resulted from
a corresponding mental injury. Instead, "[m]ental-mental claims allege that psychological ex-
periences like workplace stress.., can lead to depression, behavior problems, and chemical
dependencies." Id. at 12.
The mental-mental classification contains four subgroups: (1) sudden, extreme mental
stress; (2) sudden, acute, but more or less "normal" stress; (3) chronic, excessive stress (some
states require "unusual or extraordinary" stress rather than regular everyday life or work
stress); and (4) chronic exposure to usual mental stress. Bussey, supra, at 104-I1. For exam-
ple, a worker who fainted and required hospitalization after viewing a coworker's severed hand
experienced sudden, extreme mental stress. Id. at 104. A delinquent youth facility worker's
serious emotional reaction-with visible shaking and perspiring-to a threat on the worker's
life after a riot at the facility demonstrates sudden, acute, but more or less "normal" stress. Id.
at 106. An unexpected event such as sexual molestation at work is an example of "unusual or
extraordinary" stress. Id. at 107-08. Normal, everyday stress connected with work comprises
chronic exposure to usual mental stress. See id. at 104, 111.
Traditionally, tort law and workers' compensation statutes denied recovery for claims of
emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. Marc A. Antonetti, Labor Law: Work-
ers' Compensation Statutes and the Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in the Absence of
Physical Injury, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 671, 671-72. Courts tend to deny tort recovery for
"mental disturbance" alone unless the case demonstrates an "especial likelihood of genuine
and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee
that the claim is not spurious." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 361-62 (5th ed. 1984). Negligent telegraph messages of a death and
negligent mishandling of corpses are narrow exceptions to the general rule against recovery for
mental injury alone. Id. at 362.
Tort law further allows damages for mental injury accompanying physical impact (upon
plaintiff's person) with temporal considerations of immediateness. Id. at 362-63. Disregarding
the impact requirement, many courts now consider an "objective physical manifestation" or a
physical illness or injury authenticating the mental injury sufficient to support tort recovery;
however, "there is still considerable confusion ... as to just what conditions or symptoms
should be deemed to qualify as the requisite 'injury,' 'illness,' or other physical consequence."
Id. at 364.
6. Bussey, supra note 5, at 107 (citing Jimmy P. Mann & John Neece, Workers' Com-
pensation for Law Enforcement Related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 BEHAVIORAL SCI. &
[Vol. 27:1327
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Other states further restrict compensation by not recognizing mental
stress injuries allegedly caused by extreme and sudden mental stress.
7
California is among a small minority of states permitting compensa-
tion for mental stress injury without a showing of a "sudden or extraordi-
nary event" that triggered the injury.' Furthermore, California does not
require a corresponding physically manifested injury, but instead recog-
nizes and compensates purely psychological stress claims.9 Commenta-
tors state that California maintains a "generous" compensation standard
for mental stress injuries,"0 and California workers exceed the national
average for filing workers' compensation claims in several categories.11
L., 447, 456 app. (1990), and stating that 13 states require unusual chronic stress for
compensability).
7. Id. at 105; see supra note 5 (describing sudden, extreme mental stress category).
8. Rita Maroney McPeake, Workers' Compensation Law, in MANAGING THE PRIVATE
LAW LIBRARY 1992, at 401,412 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. 335, 1992); see Bill Leonard, Thinly Veiled Workers' Compensation Re-
form, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 23, 1991, at SDI.
Cumulative injuries-injuries that develop over time-are "well established" as compen-
sable claims under workers' compensation and constitute a "significant part of workers' com-
pensation litigation." Donald T. DeCarlo & Martin Minkowitz, Workers' Compensation and
Employers' Liability Law: Recent Developments, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 444, 447-48 (1991).
Categorized as a repetitive motion injury (RMI), McPeake, supra, at 409, carpal tunnel syn-
drome-physical injury resulting from "continuous computer keyboarding" or the "'wring-
ing' motions made by supermarket checkout clerks"-is an example of a cumulative injury, see
id. at 409, 411, 415.
In California, an injury is defined as
either: (a) "specific," occurring as the result of one incident or exposure which
causes disability or need for medical treatment; or (b) "cumulative," occurring as
repetitive mentally or physically traumatic activities extending over a period of time,
the combined effect of which causes any disability or need for medical treatment.
The date of a cumulative injury shall be the date determined under Section 5412.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1 (West 1989); see McPeake, supra, at 411. Unlike California, some
states exclude compensation for cumulative injuries due to several troublesome factors: the
speculative or remote character of a cumulative injury, the problems in verifying workplace
causation, and the subjectivity of the symptoms. Il at 411-12.
As further specified in California Labor Code § 3208, a compensable disability needs to
arise from the worker's job: "'Injury' includes any injury or disease arising out of the employ-
ment ...." See 1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.01[2][a], at 4-13.
Moreover, to be compensable, an injury must be work related. Section 3600(a) of the
California Labor Code requires that the disabling injury arise out of and occur in the course of
the employment: "Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other
liability whatsoever to any person ... shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an
employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of
the employment ...." See id. § 4.03[2], at 4-24 to 4-26.
9. See 1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.01[2][a], at 4-13 to 4-15; IB LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 42.25(a), at 7-957 to 7-958.
10. Barth, supra note 5, at 358; see lB LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.25(a), at 7-958; see also
supra note 5 (discussing mental-mental classification).
11. See MePeake, supra note 8, at 414. Overall and in specific categories, California ex-
ceeds nationwide averages in filing workers' compensation claims: "California workers file
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Indeed, for the period between 1979 and 1988, California experienced a
700% increase in workers' compensation claims for mental injuries."
Moreover, statutory amendments designed to quantify mental injury
thresholds for determining compensability may not have achieved the in-
tended effect of increasing the requisite standard of proof for psychiatric
claims. 13 One commentator suggests that the initial "pre-reform" law
required an employee to prove the mental injury claim's elements, in-
cluding causation, by a preponderance of the evidence, which is generally
considered to be a fifty-one percent standard. 4 Following the 1989 Cali-
fornia workers' compensation reform, that commentator maintains that
an employee needed to show that a lesser standard of only ten percent of
actual employment events caused the mental injury."5 The 1993 reform
required that actual events of employment be "predominant" as to all
causes combined to establish a compensable mental stress injury, unless
the injury arose from a violent act or exposure to a violent act, in which
case the event must be a "substantial"-thirty-five to forty percent-
cause of the injury. 6
The fact that employers and insurers frequently contest stress
claims' 7 exacerbates the problem because litigation expenses siphon
money away from legitimately injured workers by diverting funds to pay
claims more frequently than workers in other states .... The incidence of workers' compensa-
tion claims. . . is 22% higher than the national average." Id. On lost-time claims, California's
rate is 57% higher than the national average, and "[t]he frequency of claims for permanent
partial disability.., is 129% higher than the national average." Id.
12. Barth, supra note 5, at 358; McPeake, supra note 8, at 412; see also Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 79 n.l, 192 Cal. Rptr.
643, 647 n.1 (1983) (describing need for adequate medical reports in light of "mushrooming"
workers' compensation mental injury claims); 1B LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.25(a), at 7-958
(indicating jump in number of stress claims filed-from 1282 in 1980, to 4236 in 1984, to 6812
in 1986).
In contrast, claims for nonstress injuries increased only 25% over the past decade.
McPeake, supra note 8, at 412.
13. Jules L. Greenberg, Causation and Threshold Determinations in Workers' Compensa-
lion Psychiatric Stress Claims: Back to the Future?, 20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 111, 124 (1992).
14. Id. at 124-25 (citing Richard H. Jordan, Personnel Actions, "Stress" Claims, and the
Exclusive Remedy Rule, WORKERS' COMPENSATION Q., Summer 1991, at 1, 16).
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
17. 1B LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.25(a), at 7-958 (describing typical stress claim as "char-
acterized by absence of physical injury, little time off work, low medical treatment costs, insig-
nificant retraining costs, but a lot of litigation"). Defending mental stress claims can be
expensive. McPeake, supra note 8, at 413. Further, the litigation necessarily involves associ-
ated costs:
Even if the claim is ultimately denied, doctors providing forensic medical/legal eval-
uation must be paid by employers' insurers. At an average cost approaching $13,200,
mental stress claims were a $460 million problem in 1988.... In 1990 the average
litigation cost was $7,030 per [mental] stress case.
June 1994] REFORMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1331
for medical and legal costs. 18 Moreover, despite the fact that California's
workers' compensation system is among the largest and most expensive
systems in the nation,19 California has ranked among the lowest in com-
pensation benefits paid to workers.2"
Of the three generally recognized mental stress categories.-"physi-
cal-mental," "mental-physical," and "mental-mental"-the mental-
mental category is considered the broadest classification.2" A plaintiff, in
presenting a mental-mental claim, generally alleges that some form of
mental stress has caused mental injury.2 2 California is in the minority of
jurisdictions to allow compensation for this type of claim,2 3 and concern
over compensating mental-mental claims has led to significant but in-
complete statutory reform.24
This Comment explores the background and development of mental
stress claims in Part II. Part III discusses California's statutory and case
law involving workers' compensation and mental stress. Part IV exam-
ines the effectiveness of judicial and legislative responses to the issues
raised by compensating mental stress injuries. Finally, Part V suggests a
proposal for further statutory reform that addresses the difficulties
Id.
Thus, even though mental stress claims comprise a relatively small percentage of overall
claims, the dramatic increase in claims filed and the tendency toward litigation can strain the
system. Id. at 412-15. "At the extreme, [mental stress claims] could swamp a state's compen-
sation program, administratively or economically." Barth, supra note 5, at 349. Moreover,
workers' compensation benefit and treatment costs are "ultimately [placed] on the consumer";
that is, the employer's expenses are "passed on in the cost of the product" to the consuming
public. 1 LARSON, supra note 3, § 1.00, at I-I.
18. See John G. Kilgour, Workers' Compensation Problems and Solutions: The California
Experience, 43 LAB. L.J. 84, 94 (1992) ("All legal and medical costs.., add considerably to
the cost of workers' compensation without contributing to its objectives."); McPeake, supra
note 8, at 418.
19. A minor dispute exists as to California's exact ranking; however, California's system
consistently ranks as one of the most expensive state programs in the nation. See Kilgour,
supra note 18, at 84 (California has "most costly workers' compensation program in the
United States" and approximate total cost of national workers' compensation program "in
1988 was $43 billion and rising fast"); McPeake, supra note 8, at 414 (California has "third
most costly" workers' compensation program at $10.4 billion).
20. Kilgour, supra note 18, at 86 (ranking California 47 out of 50 state programs for maxi-
mum weekly benefit based on 1988 data); McPeake, supra note 8, at 414 ("California benefit
levels ... ranked 47th in the country."). Professor Kilgour believed that California's workers'
compensation benefits were "embarrassingly low," and that California "placed last in real
terms" due to the state's high cost of living. Kilgour, supra note 18, at 86.
21. For a description of each mental stress claim category, see supra note 5.
22. See supra note 5.
23. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also supra note 5 (describing mental-
mental category).
24. See infra parts III.A.2, III.B.
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of compensating mental stress in California workers' compensation
claims.25
II. BACKGROUND: TROUBLE FOR THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT-THE MENTAL STRESS CLAIM
A. Overview of Workers' Compensation
1. Workers' compensation goals
States have enacted workers' compensation statutes to assure an in-
come to employees who have suffered disabling injuries caused by work
events, to provide treatment and rehabilitation for those injuries, and to
facilitate a return to work.26 Statutes such as California Labor Code sec-
tion 3202 require that the provisions of workers' compensation law be
construed liberally for the purpose of extending benefits to injured work-
ers.27 Workers' compensation laws, however, were "not intended to be a
form of unemployment insurance."' 28 Workers' compensation is not the
only recourse for a disabled worker; other programs providing compen-
sation to the disabled include (1) State Disability Insurance (SDI),29 (2)
Social Security Disability30 benefits, as opposed to Social Security Retire-
25. Workers' compensation law is complex; thus, a number of issues are beyond the scope
of this Comment. Specifically, this Comment does not address causation, compensatory rates,
insurability, or other provisions.
26. See McPeake, supra note 8, at 404, 407. California's Constitution grants the state
legislature "plenary power" to establish and enforce a comprehensive workers' compensation
system. CAL. CONsT. art. XIV, § 4.
27. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1989).
28. Antonetti, supra note 5, at 690; see also ELMER H. BLAIR, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-2 (1974) ("[T]he philosophy of these laws is not to impose
upon employers an obligation to provide employees with... blanket coverage for any and all
... injuries or diseases whenever or wherever received.").
Indeed, although intended to be distinct from social insurance programs, such as Social
Security or public aid, one view is that liberal judicial interpretation of workers' compensation
statutes might be a "disguised form of social insurance for workers." Bussey, supra note 5, at
101; see also 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 1 (1992) ("Workers' compensation is
not insurance in the technical sense.., nor is it a substitute for disability or old-age pensions,
or for general health or accident insurance.") (footnote omitted).
29. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2601-2612 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). Section 2601
states that the purpose of this disability compensation is to "compensate in part for the wage
loss sustained by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to a
minimum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom." Id. § 2601. Thus, a
worker in California who suffers disability from a nonindustrially caused injury may still re-
ceive compensation from disability insurance. A more complete discussion of SDI is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 423(a) details the benefits provided
by the federal disability insurance program. The program "functions like an insurance plan"
and imposes certain requirements to qualify for disability benefits. KENNETH J. FORRESTER,
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE § 105.1, at 1-8.7 (Tina Fife ed., 1987). For example,
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ment benefits, and (3) Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 3 1 Thus, if a
disabling injury does not arise from the worker's employment, the dis-
abled worker may still pursue benefits through other programs.
32
The workers' compensation arrangement is essentially a bargain be-
tween the employee and the employer:
Under the compensation scheme, the employee relinquishes the
potential of a greater recovery available under tort theories for
the relatively swift and certain payment for medical treatment,
disability indemnity, and rehabilitation benefits available for in-
dustrially related injuries without proving fault. The employer
assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death, with-
out regard to fault, in exchange for limitations on the amount
of that liability.
33
In short, the injured worker trades the possibility of a larger monetary
award for a swift and virtually guaranteed recovery from the employer.34
the "claimant must have 1) contributed to the program (paid FICA taxes) over a sufficiently
long period during his lifetime to be 'fully insured' and 2) contributed to the program recently
enough to have 'disability insured status.' Contributions are counted in 'work quarters' which
have minimum earnings requirements." Id. A more complete discussion of Social Security
Disability benefits is also beyond the scope of this Comment.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1382 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 1381 of the Social Security
Act states the Act's purpose as "establishing a national program to provide supplemental se-
curity income to individuals who ... are ... disabled." Id. § 1381. The program limits
eligibility to receive benefits based on assets and income; SSI functions as "a federal welfare
program for the disabled." FORRESTER, supra note 30, § 105.2, at 1-8.8. A more detailed
discussion of SSI is beyond the scope of this Comment.
32. Recent commentary suggests that employees who have filed mental stress claims that
are not compensable under California's recent reforms "may resort to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which requires employers to make 'reasonable accommodations' for any phys-
ical or mental disability, work-related or not." Aurora Mackey, Redressing Stress Without
Workers' Comp: Plaintiffs May Start Turning to the Americans with Disabilities Act, CAL.
LAW., Feb. 1994, at 19, 19; see also Howard J. Stevens & Lloyd C. Loomis, Americans with
Disabilities Act and Workers' Compensation, L.A. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 26, 52 (discussing "rea-
sonable accommodation" under prior act as including "provision of a less stressful work
environment").
33. 1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.01[3], at 4-16; see McPeake, supra note 8, at 403.
34. Civil Damages, 19 CAL. WORKERS' COMPENSATION REP. 27, 28 (1991); see McPeake,
supra note 8, at 403. Of course, this assumes that the worker suffers a compensable injury;
otherwise, there is no recovery. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West Supp. 1994).
Injuries for mental suffering or physical pain that do not hinder the employee's earning
ability are not compensable under workers' compensation. 1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.01[1],
at 4-13; 2A LARSON, supra note 3, § 65.5 1(c), at 12-73 to 12-75. Such injuries are not compen-
sable because the primary goal of workers' compensation is to compensate a worker for the
"diminished ability to compete in the open labor market, and not to compensate for every
work-related injury." 1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.01[1], at 4-12 to 4-13 (citing Livitsanos v.
Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 828 P.2d 1195, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1992)).
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2. The sole remedy for a worker injured on the job
Workers' compensation functions as an "exclusive remedy" by pre-
cluding an employee from civil recovery against an employer and co-
workers for injuries arising out of or in the course of employment.35 This
means that if an employee's emotional distress injuries arise from the
employment relationship, the Workers' Compensation Act preempts tort
recovery against the employer for such injuries, whether or not physical
injuries accompany the emotional distress injuries." This preemption of
tort recovery for emotional distress injuries also includes claims for in-
tentionally inflicted emotional distress.37
35. The statute bars the employee, as well as any dependents, from pursuing remedies
outside of workers' compensation if the employee suffered a compensable injury. The perti-
nent section is California Labor Code § 3602(a):
(a) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the
right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section
and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or
her dependents against the employer, and the fact that either the employee or the
employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the em-
ployee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to
bring an action at law for damages against the employer.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West 1989).
36. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 747, 828 P.2d 1195, 1197, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
808, 810 (1992) (holding that exclusive remedy provision barred actions for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress filed by discharged worker against employer-owner
and employer's company). In Livilsanos, the court criticized a prior case, Renteria v. County
of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d. 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978), for holding that an employee could
file a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against an employer because the
nonphysical injury caused by emotional distress fell outside the scope of workers' compensa-
tion law, and was thus not compensable. Livitsanos, 2 Cal. 4th at 754, 828 P.2d at 1202, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 815. Thus, because the Renteria plaintiff's injury was not compensable under
workers' compensation, the plaintiff escaped the exclusivity provision and could pursue a civil
suit. Id. The Livitsanos court characterized the Renteria court's distinction between a physi-
cal and emotional injury as a "glaring anomaly." Id. at 752, 828 P.2d at 1200, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 813.
37. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr.
308 (1987) (holding that workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions barred inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress cause of action by firefighter who suffered total and per-
manent mental and physical disability; exclusive remedy also barred employee's spouse's
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium). Cole involved a
firefighter who, after becoming a union representative, claimed harassment, demotions, and
unfair treatment from fire department management. Id. at 152, 729 P.2d at 744, 233 Cal.
Rptr. at 309-10. The Cole court found that the exclusive remedy provision barred a civil
action regardless of the characterization of the workplace actions as outrageous and unfair.
Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
There are exceptions. The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
does not preclude tort recovery by employees discharged in violation of fundamental public
policy. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992)
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B. The Development of the Mental Injury Stress Claim
If casualty claims were rated on the New York Stock Exchange,
stress disorders would be a growth stock to watch.38
1. Riding the stress claim tide
As if the floodgates had opened, claims for mental stress injuries
have inundated workers' compensation systems.39 While physical inju-
ries caused by industrial accidents dominated the first half of the twenti-
eth century," the American Psychological Association has predicted
that stress-related injuries "will be the most pervasive occupational dis-
eases of the 21st century."4 1 In fact, mental disorders currently rank
among the top ten work-related injuries and illnesses in the nation.42
(finding that exclusive remedy provision does not preempt claim by employee constructively
discharged for supporting coworker's sexual harassment charges).
Similarly, an employee subjected to sexual harassment could recover both under workers'
compensation for disability from emotional distress and under the employer's separate liability
in a civil action for employment discrimination. See Meninga v. Raley's, Inc., 216 Cal. App.
3d 79, 86, 264 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323 (1989) (treating case as addressing two separate wrongs,
thus allowing recovery under workers' compensation and employer's civil liability for employ-
ment discrimination).
Likewise, a state employee could recover in tort for emotional distress suffered as a result
of retaliation for statutorily protected "whistle-blowing." See Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d
1, 22-23, 801 P.2d 1054, 1067, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 316 (1992). Whistle-blowing statutes pro-
tect the employee from retaliatory actions, such as demotions or terminations, taken by gov-
ernment employers after the employee reports illegal or improper activity to regulatory
authorities. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53296-53298 (West Supp. 1994).
38. Lees-Haley, supra note 4, at 194.
39. See lB LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.25(a), at 7-957; Herbert Lasky, Psychiatry and
California Workers' Compensation Laws: A Threat and a Challenge, 17 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 1
(1980).
40. See Dilworth, supra note 5, at 11.
41. Donald C. Dilworth, Psychologists Seek Ways to Reduce Workplace Stress, TRIAL, Jan.
1991, at 14, 14 (providing information from American Psychological Association).
Interestingly, despite the recent proliferation of stress claims and the specter of stress-
related injuries projected for the future, commentators suggest that workers' compensation
schemes did not originally contemplate compensating mental stress injuries. See Antonetti,
supra note 5, at 671-72 ("Recently, workers have begun to seek compensation for mental and
emotional injuries caused in the workplace .... Neither workers' compensation statutes nor
tort law traditionally allowed for recovery of emotional distress damages in such cases.");
Barth, supra note 5, at 349 ("For a number of reasons, workers' compensation systems are
finding some growth in claims for stress related disorders .... Although it seems likely that
the originators of compensation programs did not have such conditions in mind when these
systems were first developed, claims for these disorders are becoming routine ... ."); Lees-
Haley, supra note 4, at 194 ("Stress has become a widely recognized reality of modern life.
The leap to blaming an insurer for all of the consequences of modern life, however, was not
contemplated when.., workers' compensation legislation [was] written.").
42. Dilworth, supra note 5, at 11 (citing J. Donald Millar, director of National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health).
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Several factors have contributed to the increase in stress claims.43
For example, changes in attitude toward mental illnesses have made
mental illness less stigmatizing, and consequently have made the filing of
mental injury claims more socially acceptable.' Additionally, the news
and popular media have increased awareness of mental injuries in gen-
eral."5 "By now workers everywhere have heard conversations about
how stressful their jobs are."46 Finally, workers file more stress-related
claims concurrently with claims for other injuries,4 7 and thus insurance
companies may recommend that employers "pay off" questionable stress
claims rather than proceed with expensive and protracted litigation.48
2. Good intentions but unintended results
Although the goal of compensating a physically or mentally dis-
abled worker is sound, certain difficulties arise in compensating workers
for mental injuries.4 9 These difficulties arise principally from the mental-
mental claim category,50 recognized in California. At least three
problems appear intrinsic to mental-mental claims.5" The first problem is
43. Barth, supra note 5, at 349 ("For a number of reasons, workers' compensation systems
are finding some growth in claims for stress related disorders . . ").
44. See Gail Appleson, Stress on Stress, 69 A.B.A. J. 142, 142 (1983) (discussing statement
of Merton Marks, attorney who writes and lectures on stress claim defense, that "[t]here is less
reluctance socially to file a claim [for psychiatric injury]. It used to be a dark secret. But the
attitude toward mental illness has changed ... .
45. See Lees-Haley, supra note 4, at 194.
46. Id. The author, a practicing psychologist, further states that magazines advise readers
"on how to cope with stress resulting from everything from computer programming to home-
making." Id. Stress management courses at large corporations also provide a "thriving busi-
ness" for psychologists and management consultants. Id.
47. See Postol & Adelman, supra note 4, at 5; see also McPeake, supra note 8, at 412
(stating that California worker may combine physical and mental injuries in workers' compen-
sation claim).
48. See Thomas D. Elias, Work Comp Clash, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 3, 1992, at 6. A related
issue is the inadequate defense of stress claims. For example, if the employer's defense fails for
insufficient preparation when challenging a stress claim, then the result can encourage other
workers to file similar claims. Postol & Adelman, supra note 4, at 5. The employer must make
certain its employees know that the employer will contest false stress claims and use all legal
and medical channels available to "identify and deny frivolous claims." Id.
49. In the past workers' compensation claims largely focused on physical injuries, such as
mangled or severed body parts. Dilworth, supra note 5, at 11 (citing John Kamp, insurance
company psychologist involved with loss-control program, addressing workplace stress). Re-
cent worker injuries, however, tend to be more psychological and subjective. Id. Thus, a
worker claiming a stress injury poses the difficulty of assessing a largely subjective claim. Id.
at 11-12. On the other hand, a visibly bleeding wound or an X-ray confirming a broken bone
provides objective means for verifying a claimed physical injury.
50. Antonetti, supra note 5, at 672; see supra note 5 (defining and discussing mental-
mental claims).
51. See Antonetti, supra note 5, at 672.
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the substantial subjectivity of a claimed mental injury because workers'
reactions to similar situations may vary significantly.52 Second, the
claim's focus depends on the mentally injured worker's perception of sur-
rounding events.53 Finally, it is difficult to determine whether work-re-
lated stress as opposed to personal stress caused the injury.54
Indeed, these factors contribute to the continuous susceptibility to
fraud or malingering in a mental-mental injury claim." A news article
reported that even the highest official of a California labor union stated
that the "system fosters abuse." 6 Moreover, advertising by physicians
and attorneys which invites dissatisfied workers to file stress claims has
been criticized as fostering fraud. 7 Some attorneys and physicians in-
volved in high-volume workers' compensation practices assert a stress
disability for virtually every applicant.5 8 Additionally, some practition-
ers employ recruiters to encourage workers to file claims in order to gen-
erate numerous medical charges for insurance billings. 9
52. See id.; Dilworth, supra note 5, at 11-12.
53. Antonetti, supra note 5, at 672. "Thus, mentally imbalanced claimants may have dis-
torted or incorrect perceptions" regarding events involving the injury. Id.
54. Although designed to compensate for injuries caused by a worker's job, "[t]he fact that
an employee has significant stressors in his private life will not necessarily defeat his industrial
stress claim." McPeake, supra note 8, at 412.
55. David P. Gontar, The Noncompensability of Psychologically Induced Mental Disorders
in Louisiana's Worker's Compensation Law, 34 Loy. L. REv. 311, 313 (1988) ("Malingering
and fakery remain ever-present possibilities."); see McPeake, supra note 8, at 413 ("Psychiatric
stress claims make the system vulnerable to abuse.").
56. Elias, supra note 48, at 6 (discussing statement of John Henning, California Labor
Federation official); see David S. David, Special Report: Physician Speaks Out on Compensa-
tion Reform; Urges Legislature and Governor to Convene Committee of Experts, 20 CAL.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION REP. 319, 350 (1992) (stating that "a lot of abuses have crept into
every part" of workers' compensation system).
57. See McPeake, supra note 8, at 413 ("Advertisements encourage workers who don't
like their job or find their boss too demanding to file workers' compensation claims, regardless
of whether there is any real injury."); Dan Walters, Work Comp Sideshow, L.A. DAILY J.,
Apr. 27, 1992, at 6.
58. McPeake, supra note 8, at 413. The term used to refer to such operations is workers'
compensation "mills." See id.
59. Id.; see David, supra note 56, at 350 (noting "obscene" bills caused by referrals for
multiple testing and consultations by various medical specialists); Andrea Ford, Nine Held in
$50-Million Workers' Comp Fraud Case, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1993, at Al (reporting arrest of
Beverly Hills, California, physician who masterminded workers' compensation fraud ring by
recruiting laid-off workers to file false claims and accomplices to conduct "battery of unneces-
sary, overpriced tests" at clinics controlled by physician to "run up millions in phony bills");
On Stress Claims... De-Stress the Economy, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 3, 1992, at 6 (Orange County
Register editorial) (describing "hustler's paradise" where recruiters seek coconspirators from
unemployment lines at California state employment offices to participate in workers' compen-
sation fraud schemes); On Crooked Doctors... Work Comp Rackets, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 3,
1992, at 6 (Sacramento Bee editorial) (discussing study of workers' compensation medical and
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Workers' compensation fraud is a "$1 billion problem in the state,"
according to one estimate.' ° In response, the California legislature cre-
ated the Workers' Compensation Insurance Fraud Reporting Act,6 and
the State Insurance Commissioner formed a fraud investigation unit to
help curb workers' compensation fraud.62 Additionally, the legislature
undertook steps to establish a minimum three million dollar annual fund
for investigation and prosecution of workers' compensation fraud.
3
III. GUIDING CALIFORNIA DOWN THE STRESS CLAIM PATH:
JUDICIAL ACTION AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Although other states specifically exclude mental claims or specific
mental injury categories from compensability under their workers' com-
psychiatric claim referrals and estimating that unnecessary treatment or testing costs system
$356 million per year).
The legislature recently addressed the problem of employing "runners" or "cappers"-
recruiters hired to procure workers to file workers' compensation claims-in its 1993 workers'
compensation reforms. For example, California Insurance Code § 1871.7 imposes civil penal-
ties ranging from $5000 to $10,000, plus treble the amount of any submitted claim, plus any
additional penalties, upon an attorney if the attorney employs anyone to recruit clients to file
workers' compensation claims. CAL. INS. CODE § 1871.7 (West Supp. 1994); see 1993 Work-
ers' Compensation Legislation, 21 CAL. WORKERS' COMPENSATION REP. 253, 253-54 (1993).
The new legislation similarly punishes medical professionals who use recruiters to find patients
requiring services related to workers' compensation injuries. Id. at 255.
60. Martin Berg, Help for DA with Comp Fraud, L.A. DAILY J., May 14, 1993, at 2.
61. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1877-1877.5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
62. McPeake, supra note 8, at 416.
63. Californians for Compensation Reform Elects New Chairman, Unveils 1992 Reform
Packages, 20 CAL. WORKERS' COMPENSATION REP. 104, 104-05 (1992) ("Sixteen new investi-
gators have been hired specifically to investigate suspected workers' compensation fraud, and
the unit will target the professionals--doctors, attorneys, and other medical care workers in-
volved in fraud."); Hallye Jordan, Funds Sought to Fight Comp Fraud, L.A. DAILY J., June 17,
1992, at 3. Despite the seemingly large sum of $3 million, prosecutors stated that "at least
three times" that sum was necessary to fight workers' compensation fraud. Id.; see McPeake,
supra note 8, at 416-17. An assistant head deputy of the Los Angeles District Attorney's fraud
division stated that" '[t]he funding is very welcome, but it is like trying to melt an iceberg with
a can of Sterno.'" Jordan, supra, at 3.
Recent budget problems, however, have threatened the continued existence of some of
these special fraud units. Andrea Ford, Fraud Prosecutors to Be Moved in Budget Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at Bl.
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pensation statutes," California recognizes all categories, including
mental-mental claims.65
One perspective is that compensating mental-mental claims fulfils
the main goal of workers' compensation laws: compensating disabled
workers. 6 While some mental stress claims are valid and should receive
compensation, problems arise in identifying legitimate mental-mental
claims. 67 Allowing a broad, subjective standard permits greater compen-
sation of mental-mental claims. 68 Conversely, a narrow standard that
limits recovery to mental injury caused by sudden events diminishes
compensation of mental-mental claims. 9 In determining which standard
to adopt, a state must balance the interests of business-which prefers a
narrow standard to restrict potential employer liability and reduce work-
ers' compensation costs-against increased compensation to workers-
who prefer broad standards that expand employer liability.7° California
restricted its liberal policy of compensation for all categories of mental
injury claims by requiring that actual events of employment, rather than
64. Some states have statutes that, impliedly or expressly, limit the meaning of "injury" to
encompass a physical injury but not a solely mental injury. Antonetti, supra note 5, at 674-75;
see, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1043.01(B) (1983) (recovery for mental-mental claim
prohibited unless caused by "some unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress related to the
employment"); IDAHO CODE § 72-102(15)(c) (Supp. 1993) (injury "shall be construed to in-
clude only an injury caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure
of the body"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(3)(a) (1993) (injury "does not mean a physical
or mental condition arising from... emotional or mental stress").
65. California has recognized this "most liberal category of compensation" (mental-mental
claims) for over a decade. lB LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.25(a), at 7-957 to 7-958.
To establish compensability for a mental injury claim in California, the mental disorder
must either cause disability or require medical treatment, and the diagnosis of the mental
disorder must be pursuant to specified standards:
(a) A psychiatric injury shall be compensable if it is a mental disorder which causes
disability or need for medical treatment, and it is diagnosed pursuant to procedures
promulgated under paragraph (4) of subdivision (j) of Section 139.2, or until these
procedures are promulgated, it is diagnosed using the terminology and criteria of the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Third Edition-Revised, or the terminology and diagnostic criteria of other
psychiatric diagnostic manuals generally approved and accepted nationally by practi-
tioners in the field of psychiatric medicine.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(a) (West Supp. 1994).
66. Antonetti, supra note 5, at 696.
67. For a discussion of difficulties surrounding mental-mental claims, see supra notes 49-
55 and accompanying text.
68. See Antonetti, supra note 5, at 696-97. Using a "strictly subjective" standard to deter-
mine compensation greatly expands employer liability: A mental-mental claimant could re-
ceive compensation if the particular worker believed work events caused the injury, regardless
of whether or not the employment actually caused the injury.
69. Id.
70. See id.
1340 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
perceived events, cause the injury.71 Even though broad standards of
compensation further the original intent of compensating injured work-
ers, the potential for abusing the system through unfounded claims and
fraudulent influences appears sufficient to justify restrictions on mental
stress claims.72
A. Setting the Stage for Reform
1. The Albertson's decision
In 1982 the California Court of Appeal decided a landmark case
concerning mental stress claims. Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensa-
tion Appeals Board73 involved an employee who claimed mental disability
due to a subjective belief that she was a victim of harassment at work.74
The court allowed the claim, finding a compensable injury based on "an
honest misperception of job harassment which interacts with a preexist-
ing psychiatric condition" causing job stress.75
a. facts of the case
Claimant Judith Bradley, a cake decorator at Albertson's, alleged
harassment after a new manager began supervising the bakery depart-
ment.76 Initially, Bradley filed a union grievance over a reduction of
hours in her work schedule.77 Soon afterwards, Albertson's laid off
Bradley, despite her protests of seniority over another employee recently
transferred to that store from another store.78 Approximately ten days
later, the store recognized its error regarding seniority, recalled Bradley,
and laid off the other employee; Bradley, however, suffered serious finan-
cial difficulties and considered filing for bankruptcy during the lay-off
period.79
71. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
72. See Bussey, supra note 5, at 102 (discussing limits on workers' compensation coverage
and stating that "in the area of mental injury associated with mental stress, there are legitimate
reasons to maintain these limitations").
73. 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982). For a discussion of case law concern-
ing causation issues in relation to the Albertson's decision, see LASKY, supra note 3, §§ 5.1-.8,
at 49 to 63.
74. Albertson's, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 310, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Bradley's schedule changed from a usual 40-hour week to between 20 and 32
hours per week. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The store's mistake regarding seniority was that while the other employee had
overall seniority with Albertson's, Bradley had seniority at that particular store. Id. at 311,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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After Bradley returned to work, she felt harassed and ridiculed by
the bakery manager.80 Conflicts arose, and Bradley's last working day
involved a dispute over her scheduled work hours.81 When Bradley told
the manager that she had a scheduled doctor's appointment, the manager
responded angrily, embarrassing Bradley and causing her "difficulty [in]
breathing, shaking and nausea."' 82 Bradley also operated a "parttime
crystal party business," and three days after the last confrontation, Brad-
ley's supervisor telephoned to inform her that the manager's wife was
checking to see whether Bradley was working while on sick leave from
the store.83 Suffering an "anxiety attack" from that incident, Bradley
required a week's hospitalization.84
The medical evidence of Bradley's treating psychiatrist showed an
ongoing personality disorder that could "'have hypersensitized her to
the stressful experiences at work and even colored her perception of
those experiences.' "8  Albertson's psychiatric expert testified that while
it did not appear that Bradley was actually harassed at work, the expert
did not doubt that she "'subjectively perceived job harassment.' "86
b. the outcome
In Albertson's, the workers' compensation judge found a compensa-
ble injury to Bradley's "psyche."87 Subsequently, the Workers' Compen-
sation Appeals Board denied reconsideration.88 The Board found that
sufficient evidence supported the "'judge's conclusion that the employ-
ment played an active role in the development of the psychological con-
dition,' " as opposed to being a " 'mere passive element that a
nonindustrial condition happened to have focused on'" or an" 'after the
fact rationalization.' "89 The appellate court9" agreed with the Board's
80. Id. at 310-11, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 305. Bradley felt that the manager's attitude changed
and that the manager was now "very curt"; Bradley overheard the manager "ridiculing her
and talking about 'getting rid' of her." Id.
81. Id. at 311, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
82. Id., 182 Cal. Rptr. at 305. Bradley's doctor gave her a tranquilizer, and she remained
in the doctor's office for four or five hours. Id., 182 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
83. Id.
84. Id. The incident also triggered a severe stuttering problem. Id.
85. Id. at 312, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 306 (quoting report of Dr. Robert B. Cahan).
86. Id. at 312-13, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07 (quoting testimony of Dr. Alfred P. French).
87. Id. at 313, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
88. Id.; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 5911 (West 1989) (regarding appeals board reconsid-
eration).
89. Albertson's, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (quoting Workers' Com-
pensation Appeals Board finding).
90. Pursuant to California law, claimants can request review of final judgments of the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board by
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finding.91 Ultimately, the court of appeal held that an employee's claim
of cumulative injury to the individual's psyche based on an honest but
mistaken belief of job harassment, in combination with a preexisting
mental disorder, could cause job stress.92
c. cumulative, subjective stresses and strains
The Albertson's court analyzed whether a perception of harass-
ment-rather than actual harassment-was sufficient to meet causal
requirements connecting work environment and resultant mental in-
jury.93 The court, looking to variations among individuals, expounded a
subjective standard: "[W]hat is stressful to one is not to another."94 The
court stated that the disability could result from cumulative, everyday
"'stresses and strains,' "I' and that a mental injury was " 'as real and
disabling as a physical injury' "to the person who experiences it.96 Thus,
the individual's subjective perception of job harassment, rather than the
apply[ing] to the [California] Supreme Court or to the court of appeal for the appel-
late district in which he resides, for a writ of review, for the purpose of inquiring into
and determining the lawfulness of the original order, decision, or award or of the
order, decision, or award following reconsideration.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5950 (West 1989); see id. § 5810 (permitting judicial review of appeals
board judgments). Certain statutory prerequisites apply, however, before a claimant can ob-
tain judicial review. Id. § 5901 (stating that cause of action shall not arise "in any court...
until and unless the appeals board on its own motion sets aside the final order, decision, or
award and removes the proceeding to itself or if ... a petition for reconsideration . . . is
granted or denied").
The Labor Code also defines the scope of judicial review.
The review by the court shall not be extended further than to determine, based upon
the entire record which shall be certified by the appeals board, whether:
(a) The appeals board acted without or in excess of its powers.
(b) The order, decision, or award was procured by fraud.
(c) The order, decision, or award was unreasonable.
(d) The order, decision, or award was not supported by substantial evidence.
(e) If findings of fact are made, such findings of fact support the order, decision,
or award under review.
Id. § 5952.
91. Albertson's, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 317, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
92. Id. at 310, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
93. Id. at 313, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
94. Id. (citing Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 116
Cal. App. 3d 393, 171 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981)).
95. Id. at 314, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (quoting Callahan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Bd., 85 Cal. App. 3d 621, 628 n.3, 149 Cal. Rptr. 647, 651 n.3 (1978) (quoting Baker v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 861-62, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (1971)
(citing Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d
148 (1952)))).
96. Id. at 314-15, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (quoting Callahan v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 85 Cal. App. 3d 621, 628 n.3, 149 Cal. Rptr. 647, 651 n.3 (1978) (quoting Baker
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 862, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286
(1971))).
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existence of actual harassment, was sufficient to establish that stress re-
sulted from the employment.
d. the workers' compensation version of the "eggshell plaintif'"
The court also looked to the fact that a subjective test should apply
to stress-related injuries because "'[i]ndustry takes the employee as it
finds him.' "9 This concept mirrors the "eggshell skull" plaintiff famil-
iar to tort law.98 Echoing a subjective principle rather than objectively
examining the stress that an employee might normally feel in a particular
job, the court felt that the significant inquiry was to measure the stress
felt by a particular worker "reacting uniquely to the work environment.
His perception of the circumstances (e.g., crowded deadlines, mountains
of paper, a too-fast assembly line) is what ultimately determines the
amount of stress he feels."99 Thus, the perspective is not from an objec-
tive viewpoint, but rather from the individual's own perception."°°
e. the actual role of the employment in causing the injury
The Albertson's court further justified its decision to affirm Bradley's
compensation award by referring to the Board's statement that sufficient
evidence existed to find that the" 'employment played an active role' "in
97. Id. at 314, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (quoting Lamb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 274, 282, 520 P.2d 978, 983, 113 Cal. Rptr. 162, 167 (1974) (quoting Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 2d 555, 559, 166 P.2d 908, 911
(1946))).
98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 43, at 291-92; Bussey, supra note 5, at 112-13.
The philosophical differences in purposes underlying the tort and workers' compensation legal
systems might raise a question of whether the eggshell plaintiff appropriately occupies a place
in workers' compensation law. Briefly stated, tort law compensates a plaintiff for wrongful
conduct by another party in dereliction of a legal duty; a tort action's "primary purpose is to
compensate for the damage suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer." KEETON ET AL., supra
note 5, § 2, at 7. The idea of a tort defendant's liability for legal wrongdoing contrasts with the
scheme of workers' compensation law, which does not base compensation on fault. See 82
AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 1 (1992) (stating that "the right to workers' compensa-
tion [is not] based upon a theory of damages for a wrong"); 1 LARSON, supra note 3, § 1.10, at
1-1 (summarizing typical workers' compensation act and stating that "negligence and fault are
largely immaterial"). The notion of wrongdoing integral to a tort is absent under workers'
compensation principles.
Thus, one might question whether an employer should bear such broad responsibility for
an eggshell employee in a supposedly faultless workers' compensation system. This seems
especially relevant since the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) precludes an employer
from discriminating against prospective employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(Supp. III 1991).
99. A1bertson's, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
100. Id. at 315, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (citing Deziel v. Difco Lab., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 1
(Mich. 1978)).
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causing Bradley's mental injury,10 1 as opposed to "'merely provid[ing] a
stage for the event.' "2 To award compensation, the court needed to
find actual industrial causation of the illness. 10 3 The court accepted
Bradley's assertion that her employment actively affected her mental ill-
ness,"° despite the facts that Bradley's claimed stress resulted from her
misperceptions of job harassment and that she had a preexisting mental
condition. Thus, the Albertson's decision set a liberal standard"0 5 that
allowed workers' compensation for mental injury claims to rest entirely
upon the claimant's subjective perception that the employment actively
caused the mental injury.
2. The legislature reacts: The 1989 reform
As part of an omnibus workers' compensation reform package in
1989,106 the California legislature reformed the subjective perception
standard established in Albertsons's7 by adding section 3208.3 to the
California Labor Code.' 08 Section 3208.3(b), which governed claims for
psychiatric injuries, required that "actual" employment factors 0 9 consti-
101. Id. at 317, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (quoting Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
decision).
102. Id. at 316, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 309 (quoting Transactron, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 68 Cal. App. 3d 233, 238, 137 Cal. Rptr. 142, 145 (1977)).
103. Id. at 310, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
104. The court stated that the record showed that conflicts between Bradley and her super-
visor caused her "tremendous distress." Id. at 317, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
105. See Bussey, supra note 5, at 113.
106. Margolin-Bill Greene Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1989, ch. 892, § 57,
1989 Cal. Stat. 2983, 3039.
107. See I HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.69[l], at 4-97 n.8. Hanna states that California Labor
Code § 3208.3(b) abrogates the holding of Albertson's by requiring that the actual employment
events causing the mental injury "must be objectively real job stresses rather than an em-
ployee's mistaken, though honest, perception." Id. § 4.69[l], at 4-94.
108. The 1989 version states:
(a) A psychiatric injury shall be compensable if it is a mental disorder which
causes disability or need for medical treatment, and it is diagnosed pursuant to proce-
dures promulgated under paragraph (4) of subdivision (i) of Section 139.2.
(b) In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee
shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employ-
ment were responsible for at least 10 percent of the total causation from all sources
contributing to the psychiatric injury.
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to establish a new
and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric injury under this division.
Act of Sept. 26, 1989, ch. 892, § 25, 1989 Cal. Stat. 2982, 3003 (codified as amended at CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994)).
109. Presumably the legislature intended the "actual events of employment" requirement to
exclude subjective, honest misperceptions such as those at issue in Albertson's; however, the
legislature did not specifically define what constitutes "actual events" in the statute. See 1
HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.69[3][b], at 4-20; see also Herbert Lasky, Did the Workers' Compen-
sation Reform Act of 1989 Change the Rules for Handling Stress Cases? Yes, Says This View.,
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tute at least ten percent of the causation for a compensable mental in-
jury."'° Further, the statute, at that time and presently, requires that the
worker establish the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.11 In
adding these requirements, the legislature intended to set "a new and
higher threshold of compensability" for mental injury claims.I11 The leg-
islature, however, provided no guidance in defining the previous thresh-
old; thus it is unclear precisely how the standard is to be "higher."' 13
A. Reform and Reform Again
Claims of stress-hard to prove and equally hard to disprove be-
cause they usually don't involve physical injuries-are the main
focus of most reform efforts. 14
1. Intermediate reforms: Moving in the right direction?
In 1990 and 1991 the legislature amended California Labor Code
section 3208.3 to further restrict recovery for workers' compensation
mental stress claims." 5 Amended section 3208.3 required diagnosis of
mental disorders according to recognized psychological standards.'16
Additionally, when an employee has worked for an employer for less
than six months," 7 the legislature limited compensability for mental in-
jury claims to those injuries resulting from "sudden and extraordinary"
employment events."' This provision further precluded recovery for
mental stress injuries resulting from "regular and routine" employment
actions in claims filed against an employer by a worker employed for less
than six months." 19
CAL. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ENQUIRER, Sept. 1990, at 8 (discussing 1989 reform and
analyzing "actual events" language).
110. See Review of Selected 1989 California Legislation-Workers' Compensation, 21 PAC.
L.J. 569, 575 (1990).
111. Id.
112. See LASKY, supra note 3, at 12 (Supp. 1990).
113. See id. at 12-13 for a discussion of 10% causation and determination of the compen-
sability "threshold."
114. Elias, supra note 48, at 6.
115. See Dilworth, supra note 5, at 12.
116. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(a) (West Supp. 1994).
117. The six months total employment could be either continuous or noncontinuous em-
ployment. Id. § 3208.3(d).
118. Id.
119. Act of July 16, 1991, ch. 115, § 4, 1991 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994)). This section of the prior statute encompassed such em-
ployment actions as discipline, evaluations, transfers, or terminations within its "regular and
routine" definition. Id.; see Bussey, supra note 5, at 115.
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a. a standard for diagnosis: DSM-III-R
In an effort to standardize psychiatric evaluation reports, the legisla-
ture amended section 3208.3(a) of the California Labor Code to require
diagnosis of the mental disorder using the "terminology and criteria" of
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition-Revised (DSM-II-R),120 or simi-
lar widely approved and accepted diagnostic standards.'21 The DSM-
II1-R is a classification system for diagnosing various mental disorders,
with the system divided into five main categories called "axes" (Axis I,
Axis II, et cetera).1 22 Axis I deals with the "psychological state"-for
example, a posttraumatic stress disorder or a mood disorder such as de-
pression.'23 Axis II relates to personality disorders-for example, a diag-
nosis of a "dependent personality."1 24 Axis III involves diagnoses
related to physical illnesses-for example, a lower-back sprain. 25 Axis I
and Axis II diagnoses are mandatory; a mental injury claim requires an
Axis III diagnosis when appropriate.1
26
Despite the use of uniform standards such as the DSM-III-R, a
claim of stress remains largely personal to the individual claimant.'
27 If
individuals react differently to the same situation due to their own per-
sonal strengths or weaknesses, measuring a worker's job stress is essen-
120. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987).
121. Act of Sept. 29, 1990, ch. 1550, § 20, 1990 Cal. Stat.
122. The DSM-III-R uses a
multiaxial system or categories for diagnosing mental disorders.... [I]he examiner
[must] provide an Axis I and Axis II diagnosis in all cases and an Axis III diagnosis
when appropriate. The five axes of DSM-III-R are as follows:
Axis I: Clinical syndromes and specific symptoms of maladaptive behavior.
Axis 11: Personality disorders (adults) and specific developmental disorders
(children and adolescents).
Axis III: Nonpsychological medical or physical disorders that may be present.
Axis IV: Severity of psychosocial stressors.
Axis V: Level of adaptive functioning (over past few months to one year).
1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.69[3][c], at 4-100 to 4-101. Additionally, the examiner needs to
know the "legal issues defined by Workers' Compensation law and legal standards of evidence
and proof." Id. at 4-101 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 9726 (1990)); see LASKY, supra
note 3, §§ 2.1-.8, at 13 to 26 (discussing DSM-III-R).
123. Lasky defines the Axis I classification of a psychological state as "something which has
a relatively identifiable time of onset, course, and progression." LASKY, supra note 3, § 2.5, at
18-19.
124. Id. at 19. Axis II mental disorders differ from Axis I disorders because they "relate to
enduring traits which have become or always were maladaptive and have created problems."
Id.
125. Id.
126. 1 HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.69[3][c], at 4-100 to 4-101.
127. See Dilworth, supra note 5, at 12 (quoting Lois Tetrick, psychologist, Wayne State
University, Detroit, that "'stress is a perceptual phenomenon' ").
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tially a subjective analysis.' 28 To avoid subjectivity in determining
causation of mental stress, some states require a showing that the actual
work events causing the mental stress would have caused an injury to an
ordinary worker under similar circumstances.12 9
b. the six-month provision and personnel actions
In 1991 the legislature also addressed the problems of claims result-
ing from short-term employment and stress resulting from normal em-
ployment actions such as job evaluations or transfers. The legislature
amended section 3208.3 of the California Labor Code to require that a
claimant complete six months of employment, continuous or noncontin-
uous, prior to filing a mental injury claim. 130 Moreover, the Code distin-
guished between "sudden and extraordinary" and "regular and routine"
job events.13 ' The legislation considered personnel actions such as disci-
pline, demotions, or terminations as examples of normal employment
events. 132 Thus, a claimant with less than six months of employment
could receive compensation for mental injuries due to sudden and ex-
traordinary events, but not for mental injury claims arising from normal
employment events. 33
128. See id.
129. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
130. Amended § 3208.3(d) reads in pertinent part:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, no compensation shall
be paid pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury related to a claim against an
employer unless the employee has been employed by that employer for at least six
months. The six months of employment need not be continuous. This subdivision
shall not apply if the psychiatric injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary
employment condition as distinguished from a regular and routine event. As used in
this subdivision, a "regular and routine employment event" includes, but is not lim-
ited to, a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action, such as discipline,
work evaluation, transfer, demotion, layoff, or termination.
Act of July 16, 1991, ch. 115, § 4, 1991 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994)).
131. Id.; see also supra note 5 (describing examples of mental-mental categories).
132. The examples listed are not exhaustive, and the job actions must be in good faith and
without discrimination to satisfy the statute. Act of July 16, 1991, ch. 115, § 4, 1991 Cal. Stat.
(codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994)).
133. Id. A California Court of Appeal recently upheld the six-month employment provi-
sion against a constitutional challenge alleging violations of equal protection and due process
in Hansen v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
30, review denied, No. S035505, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6292, at *1 (Cal. Nov. 23, 1993). The
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board did not determine the provision's constitutionality be-
cause it lacked "the power to declare a statute unconstitutional." Id. at 1182 n.1, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 31 n.1 (citing CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (prohibiting administrative agency, such
as Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, from declaring statute unconstitutional)).
Hansen involved a waitress whose mental injury stress claim was originally denied be-
cause she had not worked for her employer for the requisite six months. Id. at 1182, 23 Cal.
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In Shoemaker v. Myers,"' the California Supreme Court held that
nonconsensual termination of employment is "a normal and inherent
part of employment,"' 135 and concluded that a stress injury arising from
Rptr. 2d at 32. Hansen alleged that the six-month requirement was "arbitrary" and violated
her constitutional equal protection and due process rights. Id. At that time, the statute per-
mitted compensation for mental injuries "related to a physical injury in the workplace or
caused by a 'sudden and extraordinary employment condition,'" but denied compensation for
mental injuries caused by normal employment events unaccompanied by physical injury. Id.
at 1183, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32; see Act of July 16, 1991, ch. 115, § 4, 1991 Cal. Stat. (codified
as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994)). In addressing the appropriate
level of constitutional review, the court determined that the distinction drawn to determine
compensability of employees' claims-length of employment--did not comprise a "'suspect
classification'" and did not "infringe on any.., fundamental rights.'" Hansen, 18 Cal. App.
4th at 1183, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32. Thus, the court applied a "rational basis" test in reviewing
Hansen's claim. Id.
Under that deferential standard of constitutional review, id., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32-33,
the court found that the six-month provision did not violate either equal protection or due
process concerns, id. at 1184, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33. The court supported its decision by
examining legislative intent.
It is part of the Legislature's response to increased public concern about the high cost
of workers' compensation coverage, limited benefits for injured workers, suspected
fraud and widespread abuses in the system, and particularly the proliferation of
workers' compensation cases with claims for psychiatric injuries. For years commen-
tators have written critically about problems unique to the disposition of psychiatric
c laims, notably vagueness in defining the injury and problems of establishing indus-
trial causation and apportionment.
... The Legislature's apparent purpose in enacting [this provision] was to limit
questionable claims for psychiatric injuries resulting from routine stress during the
first six months of employment. Underlying this policy decision is the fact that...
the new employee is customarily on probation during the first six months of employ-
ment. It is during that period when problems between the employee and the em-
ployer or supervisor often occur. Those problems often result in disciplinary action,
resignation, or termination and lead to claims of psychiatric injury due to stress.
Moreover, psychiatric injuries from stress during regular and routine employment
are necessarily cumulative injuries that occur over time. Although the imposition of
an employment period of six months may seem arbitrary to the employee, we do not
find it so arbitrary or irrational as to render the statute unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds. Nor does the statute deprive petitioner of due process of law.
Id at 1183-84, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33 (citations omitted). Thus, after disposing of the constitu-
tional issues, the court affirmed the denial of Hansen's mental injury stress claim. Id. at 1184,
23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
134. 52 Cal. 3d 1, 801 P.2d 1054, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1990); see also supra note 37 (discuss-
ing whistle-blowing statute as example of public policy exception to exclusive remedy
provision).
135. Shoemaker, 52 CI. 3d at 18, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313. The California
Supreme Court analyzed and rejected dictum in the California Court of Appeal's decision,
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 643 (1983), that mental injury caused by termination was noncompensable because it
was not work-related. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 18, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
The court had previously held in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 43 Cal. 3d
148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987), that such actions as "demotions, promotions,
[and] criticism of work practices" constitute a "normal part of the employment relationship."
Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. In Shoemaker, the court relied on its
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the termination was compensable.13 6 The Shoemaker decision may have
prompted the legislature to preclude benefits for mental injuries sustained
in the first six months of employment resulting from a good faith person-
nel action.
2. The current state of affairs: 1993 reform
Dissatisfaction with prior amendments to California's workers'
compensation law induced the legislature to undertake further reform
efforts in 1993. On July 16, 1993, the legislature again reformed the
"compensable psychiatric disorders" provisions of the workers' compen-
sation statute.'
37
The 1993 legislation enacted a number of significant changes to the
procedure for establishing a compensable mental injury claim.1 38 The
holding in Cole and stated that "[n]onconsensual termination of an employment relationship is
indistinguishable from the kinds of actions enumerated in Cole," and thus fell within the scope
of workers' compensation. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 18, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
313.
136. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 18-20, 801 P.2d at 1064-65, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14. The
court held that both physical and mental disabilities "arising from termination of employ-
ment" were usually compensable under workers' compensation. Id. at 7, 801 P.2d at 1056,
276 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
137. The 1993 workers' compensation reform was a five-bill package that amended, added,
or repealed 96 sections of the Labor, Insurance, Penal, Business and Professions, and Unem-
ployment Insurance Codes. See 1993 Workers' Compensation Legislation, supra note 59, at
219. Assembly Bill 119 specifically dealt with amendments and additions to California Labor
Code section 3208.3 regarding psychiatric claims. Id. at 220. The five bills dealt with various
reform areas: A.B. 119 (Brulte) affected psychiatric and post-termination claims; A.B. 1300
(Brown) dealt with reducing fraud; A.B. 110 (Peace) contained multiple changes to the Insur-
ance and Labor Codes; S.B. 484 (Lockyer) concerned appropriations; and S.B. 983 (Greene)
regarded collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 220-21. Under urgency provisions, these
bills took effect on July 16, 1993; however, numerous statutory changes were not operative
until after that date. Id. at 219.
138. The 1993 amendments to California Labor Code § 3208.3 included:
(b)(1) requiring an employee to establish a compensable mental injury by showing that
"actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined" by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, id. § 3208.3(b)(1) (emphasis added);
(b)(2) compensating mental injuries caused by violent acts or exposure to violent acts
when it is proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "actual events of employment were
a substantial cause of the injury," id. § 3208.3(b)(2) (emphasis added);
(b)(3) defining "substantial cause" as "at least thirty-five to forty percent of the causation
from all sources combined," id. § 3208.3(b)(3);
(d) retaining the durational provision of six months employment, continuous or noncon-
tinuous, id. § 3208.3(d);
(e) not compensating claims after notice of termination or layoff, including voluntary
layoff, when the claim is for an injury prior to termination or layoff notice unless shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that "actual events of employment were predominant as to all
causes combined ... and one or more of the following," id. § 3208.3(e): (1) sudden or ex-
traordinary events caused the injury, id. § 3208.3(e)(1); (2) employer had notice of the injury
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new law requires that actual events of employment be the predominant
cause and that violent acts or the exposure to violent acts be a substantial
cause-rather than ten percent of the cause-of the mental injury. 139 It
adds a provision that claims made after termination or layoff are not
compensable unless actual events of employment are the predominant
cause of the injury and (1) sudden or extraordinary events caused the
injury, or (2) the employer had notice of the injury prior to the termina-
tion or layoff notice, or (3) evidence of treatment prior to the notice ap-
pears in the employee's medical records, or (4) a trier of fact finds sexual
or racial harassment, or (5) evidence that the date of injury was after the
date of termination or layoff notice but was prior to the effective date of
termination or layoff. 4° Furthermore, the new law adds a provision de-
nying compensation for mental injuries substantially caused by a lawful,
nondiscriminatory, good-faith personnel action.
141
The 1993 reform, however, does retain several provisions from the
prior law, such as the preponderance of evidence burden of proof, the
standardized diagnoses of mental injuries, the six-month employment re-
quirement, and the section indicating the legislature's intent to establish
a "new and higher" compensability threshold.
1 41
Overall, the 1993 reform combined old and new provisions. The
1993 legislation took effect relatively recently, thus it is difficult to deter-
mine the extent to which these changes will be successful in confronting
prior to termination or layoff notice, id. § 3208.3(e)(2); (3) evidence of treatment for mental
injury prior to termination or layoff notice appears in employee's medical records, id.
§ 3208.3(e)(3); (4) "[ulpon a finding of sexual or racial harassment by any trier of fact, whether
contractual, administrative, regulatory, or judicial," id. § 3208.3(e)(4), and (5) evidence show-
ing the injury date after termination or layoff notice but before the effective termination or
layoff date, id. § 3208.3(e)(5);
(g) termination or layoff notice not followed within 60 days by termination or layoff is not
subject to these provisions, but issuing frequent termination or layoff notices "shall be consid-
ered a bad faith personnel action and shall make this subdivision inapplicable to the em-
ployee," id. § 3208.3(g);
(h) denying compensation for mental injury if the injury was "substantially caused" by a
"lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action," with the burden of proof falling on
the person asserting the issue, id. § 3208.3(h); and
(i) when a claimant files a mental injury claim against an employer, "and an application
for adjudication of claim is filed by an employer or employee, the division shall provide the
employer with information concerning psychiatric injury prevention programs," id.
§ 3208.3(i).
139. 1993 Workers' Compensation Legislation, supra note 59, at 221-22. Although the leg-
islature declined to identify exactly what "predominant" meant, it defined "substantial" as 35
to 40% causation. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994).
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and curing the problems associated with compensating mental injury
stress claims.
IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
A. Problems with "Predominant" Causation
Despite the legislature's latest reform effort, inherent difficulties sur-
rounding compensation of mental stress claims persist. Even though the
legislature presumably raised the compensatory threshold, its use of
"predominant cause"143 may require clarification.'" While some em-
ployers, commentators, and legislators have generally interpreted pre-
dominant to mean over fifty percent, 45 the mental injuries measured by
such a standard vary by type of disorder and treatment. It seems likely
that the debate will revolve around attempts to define standards of pre-
dominant causation for specific types of mental injuries under the new
law. 146
Although other states' workers' compensation statutes contain simi-
lar provisions, 47 those statutes contain restrictions not found in Califor-
nia's law. For example, while Maine's statute requires that the work
stress predominantly cause the mental injury, the statute further limits
compensation to stress that is "extraordinary and unusual" as compared
to stress felt in the course of acting as an "average employee."' 48 Simi-
larly, Alaska's statute requires that the stress be "extraordinary and unu-
sual" as measured against individuals in comparable work situations and
143. See supra text accompanying note 139.
144. If the statute's use of predominant is ambiguous and not further defined by the legisla-
ture, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board may adopt a rule interpreting the statute.
See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 5302, 5307 (West 1989). If the Board adopts a rule giving a more
specific meaning to the phrase "predominant as to all causes combined," the courts should
respect and treat that rule as a significant factor in determining the meaning of the phrase. See
7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 99, at 152-53
(1988) (citing Mudd v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 463, 470, 183 P.2d 10, 14 (1947)).
145. See 1993 Workers' Compensation Legislation, supra note 59, at 222 ("Some commenta-
tors and legislators have suggested that 'predominant cause' means more than 50 percent of all
combined causes." (emphasis omitted)); Hallye Jordan, Workers' Comp Vote Anticipated After
Consolidation of Proposals, L.A. DAILY J., June 17, 1993, at 3 (discussing increase in causation
standard for mental injuries to predominant level-interpreted as greater than 50% by em-
ployers and legislators).
146. By not defining specific terms, the legislature allows interpretation of the meaning of
"predominant." See 1993 Workers' Compensation Legislation, supra note 59, at 222. One
such interpretation is that, since the legislature defined "substantial" as 35 to 40%, "it could
be inferred... that anything more than 40 percent is intended to be viewed as the 'predomi-
nant' cause." Id.
147. See, eg., Antonetti, supra note 5, at 676 n.37.
148. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 201(3) (West Supp. 1993). The Maine statute
states:
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that the work stress be the predominant cause of the mental injury.'4 9
Both Maine and Alaska deny compensation for mental injuries resulting
from good-faith personnel actions. 150 While California's statute employs
a similar predominant standard, California limits compensation for
mental injuries resulting from personnel actions by denying compensa-
tion for mental injuries "substantially" caused by good-faith personnel
actions.15'
Thus, even if the legislature had quantified the predominant contrib-
utory amount, as it did in 1989152 and in certain provisions of the 1993
reform, 5 3 quantification would probably not have solved the problems
3. Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury resulting from work-re-
lated stress does not arise out of and in the course of employment unless it is demon-
strated by clear and convincing evidence that:
A. The work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to pressures
and tensions experienced by the average employee; and
B. The work stress, and not some other source of stress, was the predominant
cause of the mental injury.
The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual
events rather than any misperceptions by the employee.
A mental injury is not considered to arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment if it results from any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff,
demotion, termination or any similar action, taken in good faith by the employer.
Id.
The higher standard of proof, the "extraordinary and unusual" requirement, and the av-
erage person standard distinguish Maine's statute from California's workers' compensation
statute. Interestingly, the language concerning stress measured by actual events rather than an
employee's misperception suggests the ghost of the Albertson's decision. In that case, a Cali-
fornia appellate court affirmed a compensation award based on a worker's misperception of job
harassment. See supra part III.A.1. The California legislature subsequently amended its stat-
ute to require that a compensable workers' compensation claim establish that actual employ-
ment events caused the disability. See supra part III.A.2.
149. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(17) (Supp. 1993). The pertinent part of Alaska's workers'
compensation statute states:
"[I]njury" does not include mental injury caused by mental stress unless it is estab-
lished that (A) the work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to pres-
sures and tensions experienced by individuals in a comparable work environment,
and (B) the work stress was the predominant cause of the mental injury; the amount
of work stress shall be measured by actual events; a mental injury is not considered to
arise out of and in the course of employment if it results from a disciplinary action,
work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or similar action, taken
in good faith by the employer ....
Id.
While Alaska's statute contains familiar "actual events" language, Alaska's statute differs
from both Maine's and California's statutes by not specifically requiring objective measure-
ment standards for the mental injury.
150. Id.; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 201(3).
151. See supra note 138. California's reforms also instituted the six-month employment
requirement and notice requirements regarding terminations or layoffs. See supra parts
III.B.lb, III.B.2.
152. See discussion supra part III.A.2.
153. See discussion supra part III.B.2.
1352
June 1994] REFORMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1353
surrounding mental stress claims. Beyond requiring standardized psy-
chological diagnoses, the legislature provides no clear guidance as to how
these threshold measurements should be made.
B. Problems with Layoff and Termination Claims
The legislature has demonstrated its intent to raise compensability
thresholds for mental injury claims by increasing the proof requirements:
predominant cause, more than fifty percent of cause, versus contributing
cause, roughly ten percent of cause. Whether this factorial adjustment
achieves the legislature's goals is debatable. 54 Rather than simply in-
creasing causation thresholds, the legislature could have looked to other
means to legitimize claims.' 55 For example, in order to validate mental
stress claims, California might require a stronger showing of causation as
well as a more significant causal link between the mental injury and the
employment.
In its 1993 reform, the legislature acknowledged concerns surround-
ing mental injury stress claims filed after termination or layoff by limiting
these types of claims. As the economy declines and businesses downsize
154. Thus, while limits are necessary, apportioning causation is problematic. As one com-
mentator noted regarding the 1989 reform: "The 10 percent threshold, though sounding quite
specific and definite, will undoubtedly prove difficult to define. There is no mathematical
formula in the legislation or decisional law for factoring out 10 percent of the causation of a
mental disorder." I HANNA, supra note 3, § 4.02[3][c], at 4-22 (emphasis added); see also
LASKY, supra note 3, at 12 (Supp. 1990) (discussing 10% threshold and stating, "How do you
quantify percentage causation?... [W]e are unaware of any means by which a mathematical
formula could be derived to determine 10% of causation of a mental disorder .... ").
155. Additionally, increasing percentages will not reduce the "dueling doctors" situation
regarding conflicting medical reports offered by the employee and the employer. Similar to
personal injury litigation involving a battle of expert witnesses, disputed workers' compensa-
tion claims involve medical experts for the employee, who find a compensable disability, versus
the employer's medical experts, who will find to the contrary. See Postol & Adelman, supra
note 4, at 5.
Moreover, even if both sides agree that a mental disability exists, medical professionals for
each party can still dispute the percentage of causation necessary to satisfy thresholds for
compensable injuries. See id. (regarding "conflicting testimony of opposing medical experts"
and "uncertainty inherent in a medical analysis of emotional or psychiatric injuries"); see also
Power v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 179 Cal. App. 3d 775, 224 Cal. Rptr. 758
(1986) (involving four psychiatric opinions evaluating correctional officer's workers' compen-
sation claim that job stress caused overeating and resultant obesity; two opinions supported
claim, two psychiatrists found no compensable mental injury, and court ultimately denied
claim).
The legislature has attempted to address this issue. Recent proposals included provisions
to limit the cost and number of medical evaluations. In August 1993 the Administrative Di-
rector of the Division of Workers' Compensation promulgated new regulations and established
a medical-legal fee schedule for initial medical-legal evaluations. See 1993 Workers' Compen-
sation Legislation, supra note 59, at 256.
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or cease operations, terminated or laid-off workers claim stress inju-
ries. "'56 One might question whether compensating this type of mental
injury claim fulfills the intended purposes of workers' compensation-to
provide treatment and financial assistance to workers disabled through
their employment.1 17 Indeed, other states deny workers' compensation
benefits for mental injuries resulting from terminations or layoffs.' 8
Such denials may appear harsh, but the disabled worker is not left with-
out compensation. State unemployment insurance benefits, rather than
workers' compensation benefits, are available during the time the worker
is unable to find employment.' 59 Thus, while the legislature's reforms
have addressed several pertinent issues, further efforts are necessary to
effectively manage the problems stemming from workers' compensation
mental stress claims.
V. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Oregon's workers' compensation statute provides a model for bal-
ancing the need to provide benefits for work-disabled employees against
fairness to employers. Adopting aspects of the Oregon system could
strengthen and improve California's workers' compensation system.
156. Regarding depressed economies,
we go considerably further if we say that economic trauma was within the contem-
plation of the framers of the workers compensation laws and that they intended that
everyone who was laid off from employment and therefore sustained a psychiatric
"major depression"... was entitled to workers compensation benefits. This country
once had a great depression which produced many "major depressions." Profession-
als in this field know that every time there is a plant closing it is followed by a mass
of hearing loss claims, continuous trauma back claims and pulmonary claims (the list
is not intended to be comprehensive). We doubt that the framers of the Act intended
"major depression" due to job loss because the industry can't meet foreign competi-
tion or because the individual employer is simply incompetent, to be considered a
workers' compensation injury.
LASKY, supra note 3, at 15 (Supp. 1990).
157. Id. at 16 (Supp. 1990). "Considering the original purposes of the founders of the
workers' compensation laws[,] it does not appear that they include benefits for workers whose
injuries stemmed not from the process of producing goods but from being terminated from
engaging in their production." Id.; see also supra part II.A.I (discussing goals of workers'
compensation).
158. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(17) (Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-
A, § 201(3) (West Supp. 1993).
159. The fact that unemployment insurance benefits are limited in duration while workers'
compensation benefits continue throughout a worker's disability may influence some claimants
to file workers' compensation claims upon becoming unemployed, See discussion supra part
II.A.1.
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A. Oregon's Solution
1. Statutory requirements
Like California, Oregon's workers' compensation system costs were
high, and Oregon aimed reform efforts at reducing those costs.' 6  The
Oregon statute categorizes a mental injury as an occupational disease and
restricts compensable mental injuries to those that "require[ ] medical
services or result[ ] in physical or mental disability." '16 Oregon's statute
denies compensation for mental disorders that are not caused by objec-
tive work conditions, and for mental injuries that result from ordinary
working situations or reasonable personnel actions. 162 Additionally, Or-
egon's statute requires a "generally recognized" standard of diagnosis
and clear and convincing evidence that the mental injury arose from the
employment. 163
Despite reluctance to compensate mental injuries before 1980,16 the
Oregon judiciary established requirements similar to California's prior
statute. Relying on its prior decision,165 an Oregon appellate court in
Korter v. EBI Cos. 166 announced a standard for compensating mental
injury: (1) The mental injury did not have to result from an "extraordi-
nary unanticipated event";' 67 (2) "usual and ordinary job stress" could
160. James L. Edmunson, 1987 Reforms of Oregon's Workers' Compensation Law, 24 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 321, 322-23 (1988). Oregon's legislature also attempted to balance eco-
nomic interests through cost savings against possible harm to employees by restricting
compensation rights. Id. at 338.
161. Oregon's workers' compensation statute states in part:
Any mental disorder which requires medical services or results in physical or mental
disability or death.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a mental disorder is
not compensable under this chapter:
(a) Unless the employment conditions producing the mental disorder exist
in a real and objective sense.
(b) Unless the employment conditions producing the mental disorder are
conditions other than conditions generally inherent in every working situation or
reasonable disciplinary, corrective or job performance evaluation actions by the em-
ployer, or cessation of employment.
(c) Unless there is a diagnosis of a mental or emotional disorder which is
generally recognized in the medical or psychological community.
(d) Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder
arose out of and in the course of employment.
OR. RaV. STAT. § 656.802(I)(b), (3)(a)-(d) (1991).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 656.802(3)(c)-(d).
164. See Bussey, supra note 5, at 109.
165. See James v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 605 P.2d 1368 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
166. 610 P.2d 312 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
167. Id. at 315 (citing James, 605 P.2d at 1370-71).
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cause a compensable mental injury; 16 and (3) a preexisting mental con-
dition did not preclude compensability if the employee proved that work
activity worsened the condition to the extent of disability or need of med-
ical services.' 69 One commentator stated that a "deluge of claims" fol-
lowed the Korter decision. 170 In response Oregon's Supreme Court tried
to restrict the compensability standards in James v. State Accident Insur-
ance Fund.7 ' Nevertheless, the court's efforts were unsuccessful, and
"[d]espite [the compensability restrictions], the number of mental stress
claims continued to increase, especially from those working in state agen-
cies. '  Oregon's legislature responded by amending its workers' com-
pensation statute in 1987.173
In comparing Oregon's statute to California's statute, several differ-
ences are obvious. First, Oregon excludes disorders produced by events
inherent in every work situation.1 74 California, however, allows compen-
sation for cumulative mental injuries without requiring extraordinary
stress.175  Second, Oregon does not quantify stress arising from such
events as reasonable personnel actions, as does California, but rather bars
those claims outright.176 Finally, Oregon requires an employee to prove
that the "mental disorder arose out of and in the course of the claimant's
employment" by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.' 77 In contrast, and despite numerous reform
efforts, California's statute has retained a lesser standard of proof.'
7
1
Both states, however, do have similar provisions requiring that objective




170. Bussey, supra note 5, at 110.
171. 624 P.2d 565 (Or. 1981), cited in Bussey, supra note 5, at 110.
172. Bussey, supra note 5, at 110 (citing Edward M. Colbach, The Mental-Mental Muddle
and Work Comp in Oregon II, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 253, 255 (1985)).
173. Id. at 110-11 (describing changes to Oregon statute).
174. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(3)(b).
175. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. Edmunson, supra note 160, at 336. James Edmunson suggests that by making stress
claims harder to prove, litigation will become more complicated, and that "the highly subjec-
tive factors involved" may not allow standardized assessments of mental stress claims. Id. at
338. Although, in cases where industrial causation of stress is weak or evidence of nonwork-
related causation is strong, doctors or attorneys might be less likely to pursue a marginal claim
under a higher standard of proof.
178. See infra note 190.
179. See supra note 109 for a discussion of California's "actual events" requirement and
supra note 161 for Oregon's requirements.
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2. Judicial interpretation
A review of case law, prior to and after amendment of Oregon's
workers' compensation statute, illustrates the efficacy of several provi-
sions of Oregon's statute. Oregon's current law specifies that a compen-
sable mental injury must require medical treatment, as well as diagnosis
of a generally recognized mental or emotional disorder.80 Prior to the
effective date of the amended law, two applicants, who otherwise lacked
a diagnosed mental or emotional disorder, claimed that job stress exacer-
bated their preexisting multiple sclerosis conditions and received com-
pensation. 81 Three recent Oregon cases illustrate the difference between
the initial and the amended law. In one case the court denied compensa-
tion to an applicant who claimed that stress exacerbated a preexisting
multiple sclerosis condition," 2 and in two others, the court denied com-
pensation to applicants who claimed that job stress caused their medical
injuries.
18 3
180. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(l)(b), (3)(c).
181. See State Accident Ins. Fund v. Carter, 698 P.2d 1037, 1038 (Or. Ct. App. 1985);
Abbott v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 609 P.2d 396 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). Carter involved an
Oregon State Senator, also head of the Workers' Compensation Department, who claimed that
ethics investigations and corresponding publicity worsened a preexisting multiple sclerosis
condition. 698 P.2d at 1038. Although exacerbations are an expected condition of multiple
sclerosis and despite contrary medical testimony, the court chose to believe a physician it
considered as the more experienced multiple sclerosis expert, and thus affirmed the Board's
finding of a compensable claim. Id. at 1038-40.
Similarly, the Abbott claimant, a legal secretary who had worked for an attorney specializ-
ing in workers' compensation cases, alleged a worsening of multiple sclerosis due to stress. 609
P.2d at 397. Again confronted with conflicting medical evidence, the court affirmed the refe-
ree's and the Board's findings of compensability based upon the particular expertise of a physi-
cian (the same doctor as in Carter) who believed stress aggravated multiple sclerosis. Id. at
397-98.
182. Burris v. SAIF Corp., 841 P.2d 696 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). Like the Carter and Abbott
claimants, the employee in Burris claimed that job stress worsened a multiple sclerosis condi-
tion. Id. at 697. The court agreed with the Board that a claim for an exacerbated medical
condition due to job stress fell under the state's occupational disease definition. Id. Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the Board's denial of compensation because the claimant did not
prove that he had a "generally recognized mental disorder" pursuant to § 656.802(3)(c) of the
statute. Id.
183. In Mathel v. Josephine County, 858 P.2d 450 (Or. Ct. App. 1993), the claimant had
controlled his hypertension for a number of years. Id. at 450. The claimant had a heart attack
following two exceptionally stressful workdays. Id. Following precedent, the court stated that
"any claim that a condition is caused by on-the-job stress must be considered a claim for
mental disorder under ORS 656.802." Id. at 451 (citing SAIF Corp. v. Hukari, 833 P.2d 1307
(Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 840 P.2d 709 (Or. 1992)). The court believed that the 1990
amendments to Oregon's statute did not affect its determination on this issue, and denied com-
pensation because Mathel did not have a diagnosed mental condition under the statute. Id. In
amending the statute in 1990, the legislature added minor wording changes and shifted the
language from one section into a subsection, but did not alter the provisions regarding com-
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Two 1992 Oregon decisions denied compensation for reasonable dis-
ciplinary actions consistent with Oregon's amended statute. 184 The first
case involved a police dispatcher who alleged that her stress was caused
by disciplinary action taken after she failed to dispatch an ambulance.' 85
The second case involved a claim found to be noncompensable because
the alleged stress resulted from reasonable discipline.'
86
pensation for mental injuries. Id. One judge dissented, however, believing that the court
should overrule Hukari and not apply the mental disorder provisions to deny claims for physi-
cal conditions caused by job stress, as the legislative history did not support the majority's
interpretation concerning "mental disorders." Id. at 451-53 (Deits, J., dissenting).
In Sibley v. City of Phoenix, 813 P.2d 69 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), a police chief suffered
hypertension due to fears about his job security. Id. Rather than asserting an occupational
disease from exposure to certain hazardous substances or as a mental disorder, Sibley claimed
that "various stress-causing incidents on the job were a 'series of traumatic events or occur-
rences'" under the statute. Id. at 70. Sibley unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the court
that " 'traumatic event' must be read to encompass emotional trauma, so that his claim, which
[was] not compensable under subsection (1)(b) because it [did] not involve a mental disorder,"
fell within a "catch all" provision. Id. (describing claimant's argument that § 856.802(l)(c) is
catch-all meant to provide "'general category' of occupational disease"). The court declined
to read this provision broadly to include emotional as well as physical traumas. Id. In deny-
ing the claim, the court concluded that subsection (1)(c) applied to situations involving
"'micro-trauma' or 'overuse' syndromes, such as degenerative back conditions, carpal tunnel
syndrome[,] and hearing loss, caused by repetitive physical trauma or activity." Id. at 70-71.
184. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(3)(b).
185. Thrash v. City of Sweet Home, 825 P.2d 289 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). The claimant,
Thrash, received a call from a doctor to dispatch an ambulance for an elderly, comatose pa-
tient, but failed to do so until a second call from the doctor more than an hour later. Id. at
290. Although the patient recovered, Thrash apparently felt "great emotional distress" over
the incident, largely due to a fear of being seriously disciplined. Id. Thrash went through a
disciplinary hearing that determined she had committed misconduct, and she filed a stress
claim a few days later. Id. Affirming the referee's findings, id. at 289, and in determining the
claim's compensability, the Board excluded the disciplinary proceedings from its consideration
because the statute does not compensate mental disorders resulting from reasonable discipline.
Id. at 291. The claimant attempted to argue that the discipline was "unlawful"-and thus
unreasonable-but the court affirmed the Board's decision that Thrash failed to establish that
"her claim arose out of her employment" and denied compensation. Id.
186. SAIF Corp. v. Hukari, 833 P.2d 1307 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 840 P.2d 709 (Or.
1992). The claimant alleged that job stress following a misconduct investigation and subse-
quent reprimand worsened a preexisting medical condition. Id. at 1307. The referee con-
cluded that, because the claim properly fell under a physical condition and not a mental
disorder, claimant had a compensable physical disability claim. Id. at 1308. The Board af-
firmed the referee's decision, although it disagreed with the referee's analysis. Id. The Board,
characterizing the "flare-up" of claimant's medical condition as a "compensable injury," did
not apply the mental disorder provisions. Id. Looking to the statutory amendments and legis-
lative intent, the court instead determined that the occupational disease provisions in
§ 656.802(l)-(2) did apply to the claim. Id. at 1308-09. The court distinguished between an
independent compensation claim for a stress-caused disability and a treatment claim for a
consequential mental condition. Id. at 1309. Finding an independent claim, the court denied
compensation because the claimant's stress resulted from a reasonable "corrective evaluation"
by the employer. Id.
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As briefly depicted, Oregon courts follow the amended statutory
guidelines in awarding workers' compensation benefits; California's legis-
lature could similarly refine the scope of its workers' compensation laws.
While such limitations may deny compensation of some claims, the goals
of workers' compensation are to provide employees with financial sup-
port, rehabilitation and treatment, and to facilitate a return to work
when they suffer industrially caused injuries."8 7 If the mental stress is
not caused by employment, a disabled worker can seek compensation
through other sources, such as state disability benefits or federal social
security programs. 18 Workers' compensation is not designed, nor
should it function, as an exhaustive social insurance program providing
blanket coverage for any mental stress disability.18 9
B. Proposed Solution for California
California's present workers' compensation law should be amended
to increase the evidentiary burden to a clear and convincing standard to
require a claimant to show a supportable foundation for the stress
claim. 190 Additionally, the statute should retain the restrictions regard-
ing mental injuries resulting from personnel actions, such as layoffs or
disciplinary actions, as long as employers act reasonably and in good
faith.19' Workers' compensation provides subsistence to a person unable
to work due to a work-related injury; it is not intended to compensate for
a worker's depression resulting from reasonable criticism or unavoidable
layoffs.
1 92
187. See supra part II.A.l.
188. See discussion supra part II.A.1.
189. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
190. See infra part V.C (detailing proposed amended statute).
In 1992 the legislature considered two competing plans-dubbed the "Republican Plan"
and the "Democratic Plan" based on the principal authors' political party affiliation-aimed at
reducing workers' compensation costs. 1992 Workers' Compensation Legislation, 20 CAL.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION REP. 101, 101 (1992). The Republican Plan, as advanced by As-
semblyman Brulte, included a provision requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish
compensability of a claimed mental injury. Id. Unlike this Comment's suggested proposal,
the Republican Plan further limited compensation of mental injuries to those caused "by an
actual, sudden and extraordinary employment event." Id. Additionally, the Republican Plan
excluded mental injury claims arising from "a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel
action," and immunized employers "under the exclusive remedy rule from civil damages liabil-
ity for both compensable and noncompensable [mental] injury." Id. (emphasis omitted). The
Assembly Committee on Insurance, however, failed to pass the Republican Plan, and thus it
did not reach the Senate. 1992 Workers' Compensation Legislation, 20 CAL. WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION REP. 158, 158 (1992).
191. See infra part V.C (detailing proposed amended statute).
192. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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The perceived exodus of employers from California"' and the legis-
lature's struggle at reform suggests that workers' compensation must be
fair to employers as well as protective of disabled employees.194 The leg-
islature can achieve this balance without curtailing the broad range of
compensable mental stress injuries by requiring the employee to establish
causation of the mental stress injury with clear and convincing evidence
rather than with the current preponderance of the evidence standard.
Although a preponderance of the evidence standard is generally ap-
plicable in civil cases in California,19 "constitutional, statutory, or deci-
sional law" can require a higher or lesser standard of proof.196 The
California Supreme Court in Weiner v. Fleischman 19 7 stated that in cer-
tain situations, the courts require the weightier clear and convincing
standard "because of historical and pervasive... skepticism"' 198 regard-
ing the validity of certain types of claims. For example, in cases ques-
tioning the existence of an oral trust, courts have increased the standard
to clear and convincing evidence "because of special concerns that the
terms of the trust specify the information needed for courts to deal with
the trust." 199
Skepticism and special concerns can also exist when courts hear
workers' compensation claims alleging disability due to mental stress.
As indicated by the California Law Revision Commission, a problem en-
countered in proving the terms of an oral trust is the "risk of perjury,
particularly by those with something to gain."" Similarly, one might
193. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 note (West Supp. 1994) (Historical and Statutory
Notes) (letter from Gov. Pete Wilson to California Assembly stating that California's fraud-
ridden workers' compensation system has cost approximately 60,000 jobs per year statewide
(July 16, 1993)); Elias, supra note 48, at 6.
194. See supra part III.
195. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, the
burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.").
196. 2 BERNARD S. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 45.1, at 602 (2d
ed. Supp. 1990) ("Normally, the burden of proof with respect to a particular fact requires
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. But constitutional, statutory, or decisional law is
free to establish ... a heavier or lighter burden of proof.... ."); see 1 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA EVIDENCE § 157, at 135 (3d ed. 1986) ("[U]nless a greater or lesser burden is imposed by
statute or judicial decision, the party with the burden of proof satisfies it by a preponderance of
the evidence.").
197. 54 Cal. 3d 476, 816 P.2d 892, 286 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1991).
198. Id. at 489, 816 P.2d at 900, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
199. Id. The court cited amendments regarding exemplary damages, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294 (West Supp. 1994), and concerning oral trusts of personal property, CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 15207 (West 1991).




question the authenticity of a mental injury stress claim given the poten-
tial for abuse in filing a marginal claim to obtain disability benefits.2 01
In addition to concerns regarding the validity of stress claims, an-
other troublesome aspect of compensating disabling mental stress inju-
ries, particularly mental-mental injuries, is that while many potential
causes of mental stress exist,2 02 sources for compensating mental stress
disability are limited. If perceived as the only source of compensation or
the most accessible deep pocket entity,20 3 workers' compensation be-
comes the target for remuneration by unethical professionals and
claimants. 2 4
The causes of stress in an employee's life are best known to the em-
ployee.205 Thus, it is unfair to place the burden of negating nonwork
factors as the cause of the employee's mental stress injury on the em-
ployer. If other nonwork matters might have caused an employee's
stress, the employee can more readily show why those matters are not the
predominant cause of the employee's mental stress injury than an em-
ployer or insurer can positively show that nonwork matters are a
predominant cause of the disability. Given the employee's unique knowl-
edge of stressful matters in the employee's life and the increasing privacy
demands upon employers, it is equitable to require that the employee
offer clear and convincing proof of the causal link between employment
and mental injury disability.
Also, as a matter of fairness, the employer should not be penalized
for merely demanding that the employee perform his or her job. The
employer is entitled to expect reasonable skill, service in conformity with
place of performance, and substantial compliance with lawful directions
in the course of service.20 6 The law should not penalize employers for
adjusting their work forces to the demands of an open market, since such
situations are generally beyond the employers' control. Employers must
often regulate employee performance and respond to market forces by
taking actions disfavored by the employee. Such actions include critical
evaluations, warnings, suspensions, layoffs, and terminations, all of
201. See supra part II.B.2.
202. For example, a worker might experience stress from factors other than work, such as
failed relationships, financial problems, or family illnesses. See supra note 54 and accompany-
ing text.
203. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West Supp. 1994) (mandating that all employers secure
workers' compensation for employees).
204. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
205. See Barth, supra note 5, at 359 ("Employers are unlikely to know which employees are
near a breaking point, nor can they gauge what effect workplace stresses have, in conjunction
with other potential sources of impairment.").
206. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2854, 2856-2857 (West 1989).
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which are usually stressful to the employee. Alternative resources, such
as state disability insurance, can provide compensation for disabilities
arising from reasonable, good-faith personnel actions.
Thus, while the suggestions presented herein may not solve all of
California's workers' compensation problems, a clear and convincing
standard requiring a stronger showing to justify work-related causes of
stress would discourage fraud and frivolous claims. Denying workers'
compensation mental stress claims following reasonable, good-faith per-
sonnel actions, such as terminations due to plant closures, would channel
stress-disabled workers into more appropriate programs-unemployment
insurance or state disability systems for example. Thus, restrictions con-
tained in the proposal might cause some actions to fail, but legitimately
disabled workers with valid claims should still be able to satisfy the
higher evidentiary standard. Moreover, other social insurance programs
exist to support a disabled worker when the mental injury is not caused
by employment.
C. Proposed Amended Workers' Compensation Law
A proposed statute could revise California's current law governing
compensable mental injuries to reflect these concerns.2 "7 The revised
statute, with brackets representing portions of existing law to be removed
or replaced, would read:
(a) A psychiatric injury shall be compensable if it is a mental
disorder which causes disability or need for medical treatment, and it is
diagnosed pursuant to procedures promulgated under paragraph (4) of
subdivision (j) of Section 139.2 or, until these procedures are promul-
gated, it is diagnosed using the terminology and criteria of the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Third Edition-Revised, or the terminology and diagnostic cri-
teria of other psychiatric diagnostic manuals generally approved and ac-
cepted nationally by practitioners in the field of psychiatric medicine.
(b)(1) In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable,
an employee shall demonstrate by [a preponderance of the evidence]
clear and convincing evidence that actual events of employment were
predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of employees whose
injuries resulted from being a victim of a violent act or from direct expo-
sure to a significant violent act, the employee shall be required to demon-
207. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (West Supp. 1994).
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strate by [a preponderance of the evidence] clear and convincing evidence
that actual events of employment were a substantial cause of the injury.
(3) For the purposes of this section, "substantial cause" means at
least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all sources combined.
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to es-
tablish a new and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric in-
jury under this division.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, no com-
pensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a psychiatric injury
related to a claim against an employer unless the employee has been em-
ployed by that employer for at least six months. The six months of em-
ployment need not be continuous. This subdivision shall not apply if the
psychiatric injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment
condition. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to authorize an
employee, or his or her dependents, to bring an action at law or equity
for damages against the employer for a psychiatric injury, where those
rights would not exist pursuant to the exclusive remedy doctrine set forth
in Section 3602 in the absence of the amendment of this section by the
act adding this subdivision.
(e) No compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a
psychiatric injury if the employment conditions producing the psychiat-
ric injury result from reasonable disciplinary, corrective, or job perform-
ance evaluation actions by the employer, or cessation of employment, if
such actions are lawful, nondiscriminatory, good-faith personnel
actions.2 o8
(f) Where the claim for compensation is filed after notice of termi-
nation of employment or layoff, including voluntary layoff, and the claim
is for an injury occurring prior to the time of notice of termination or
layoff, no compensation shall be paid unless the employee demonstrates
by [a preponderance of the evidence] clear and convincing evidence that
actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined
of the psychiatric injury and one or more of the following conditions
exist:
(1) Sudden and extraordinary events of employment were the cause
of the injury.
(2) The employer has notice of the psychiatric injury under Chapter
2 (commencing with Section 5400) prior to the notice of termination or
layoff.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
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(3) The employee's medical records existing prior to notice of termi-
nation or layoff contain evidence of treatment of the psychiatric injury.
(4) Upon a finding of sexual or racial harassment by any trier of
fact, whether contractual, administrative, regulatory, or judicial.
(5) Evidence that the date of injury, as specified in Section 5411 or
5412, is subsequent to the date of the notice of termination or layoff, but
prior to the effective date of the termination or layoff.
(g) For purposes of this section, an employee provided notice pursu-
ant to Sections 44948.5, 44949, 44951, 44955, 44955.6, 72411, 87740, and
87743 of the Education Code shall be considered to have been provided a
notice of termination or layoff only upon a district's final decision not to
reemploy that person.
(h) A notice of termination or layoff that is not followed within 60
days by that termination or layoff shall not be subject to the provisions of
this subdivision, and this subdivision shall not apply until receipt of a
later notice of termination or layoff. The issuance of frequent notices of
termination or layoff to an employee shall be considered a bad faith per-
sonnel action and shall make this subdivision inapplicable to the
employee.
[(h) No compensation under this division shall be paid by an em-
ployer for a psychiatric injury if the injury was substantially caused by a
lawful, nondiscriminatory, good-faith personnel action. The burden of
proof shall rest with the party asserting the issue.]
(i) When a psychiatric injury claim is filed against an employer, and
an application for adjudication of claim is filed by an employer or em-
ployee, the division shall provide the employer with information con-
cerning psychiatric injury prevention programs.
Revised section (e) represents portions of Oregon's provision
(3)(b),2 ° 9 combined with a portion of California's statute.210 Regarding
section (b)(2), the proposal might retain a minimum standard of proof
for this provision because a generally recognized traumatic incident lends
authentication to the mental injury's causation, unlike a claim for non-
specific mental stress.
VI. CONCLUSION
California is one of very few states to allow workers' compensation
for mental-mental stress injuries. 21I This liberal standard has given rise
209. See supra note 161.
210. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3(h).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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to a flood of mental stress injury disability claims,2 12 and distinguishing
legitimate from wishful claims appears to consume a disproportionate
expense of the workers' compensation system.213 Due to the complexity
of the issues involved and the attendant complications discussed above,
the problems associated with compensating mental stress claims2 14 are
not likely to disappear. Indeed, it is likely that stress-related injuries will
become increasingly prevalent.215
Although resolving the many problems associated with stress claims
might prove difficult, the legislature can begin by realistically addressing
the situation. Rather than adding complex formulas to define circum-
stances for compensating a stress claim, the legislature can impose limita-
tions as necessary, while maintaining a balance of fairness toward both
employee and employer. Increasing the evidentiary burden for mental
injury stress claims to a clear and convincing standard and exempting
stress claims resulting from reasonable, good-faith personnel actions are
steps the legislature can take toward managing the stress claim situation.
Finally, despite necessary efforts to reduce fraudulent mental stress
claims, the state should not lose sight of the underlying purpose of work-
ers' compensation-compensating injured employees-rather than con-
verting workers' compensation into general social insurance.
Aya V Matsumoto*
212. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
214. Postol & Adelman, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing "newest workers' compensation
nightmare-mental stress claims").
215. See supra part II.B.1.
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